Sanctions are a powerful tool for states to use in the pursuit of their interests. But what they actually do depends on the economic historical environment that they operate in, and how they are calibrated to the specific goals that they seek to achieve. This is why it is important to study sanctions from a different angle than the simple utilitarian, game-theoretical framework that many policy discussions use, and that is why the Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB) was developed.
GSDB provides a standardized, open access data framework that allows scholars and students to compare and contrast the effectiveness of different sanctions against the goals they are designed to pursue. The GSDB also helps to identify areas where additional research is needed. This is especially true in the MENA and Africa regions, which currently do not have a strong GSDB dataset with decades of improvements behind it.
The GSDB shows that the most common purpose of sanctions is to prevent terrorist groups from being financially supported, and that this often works. However, sanctions are less effective against other goals that countries may want to accomplish. For example, threats tend to create resentment and anxiety, while incentives are more likely to foster cooperation and hope. This is why many experts recommend combining or using incentives with sanctions to enhance their efficacy.
The GSDB’s findings show that, on average, sanctions are successful about 30% of the time for their intended goal. This is a high rate for an interventionist tool, and it could explain why so many countries continue to employ them.